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1 Questions of creativity
What does creativity produce? A concept is ‘a mental representation of a class of things’
Murphy (2002, p.5), and concepts are the primary output of a creative process. In other words,
creativity is the process in which a creative agent recognises a new kind of thing, or modifies their
understanding of a kind of thing, changing their view of the world in some valuable way. The
visible output of a creative process may be a single thing, but it is the novelty and value of the
concept behind the thing that shows creativity. The creative outcome is in the mind, not in a
physical object.
Where are concepts represented? A conventional view is that conceptual representation,
and indeed cognition in general is functionally separated from perception. Theories of embodied
cognition however take the view that concepts are inherently perceptual; that concepts arise
from recurrent states in sensory-motor systems, which in turn form the building blocks of higher
level abstract thought. If we creatively generate new concepts, then we are literally altering our
perception of the world and of ourselves.
How are concepts represented? How a concept is represented in human cognition is an open
question, for example one view is that a concept is represented by a single best example or proto-
type, and another being that a concept is represented by a large number of memories, or exemplars.
Theories of embodied cognition such as perceptual symbol systems proposed by Barsalou (2009)
and conceptual spaces proposed by Ga¨rdenfors (2000) take the prototype view. For example ac-
cording to Barsalou (2009) concepts are based on incomplete, distorted and often vague summaries
of prior perceptual states. Barsalou attributes the unpopularity of embodied cognition to the lack
of understanding of this fragmentary and partly subconscious nature of perception. Ga¨rdenfors
(2000) also takes a prototype view, but in addition proposes that concepts are inherently geomet-
ric, where conceptual properties are convex regions within the quality dimensions of conceptual
domains. He goes on to base a system of cognitive semantics on this geometric view, grounded in
spatial metaphor as mappings between geometric domains.
What is creative search? Creativity is described by Boden (1990) and formalised by Wiggins
(2006a,b) as a search in a space. Three sets of rules are employed in this search; rules defining
traversal of the space, evaluation of the concepts found in the space, and the space itself. However,
a creative search is more than a reactive process of traversal and evaluation. Creativity also
requires introspection, self-modification and for boundaries to be broken. In other words, the rule
sets described above need to be examined and challenged by the agent following them. In the
terms of Ga¨rdenfors (2000), the search space is a concept, and the search is for concept instances.1
1The terms used by Ga¨rdenfors (2000) diverge from those used by Wiggins (2006a,b). Wiggins uses the term
conceptual space in the place of Ga¨rdenfors’ concept, and concept in the place of concept instance. The meaning is
however the same, particularly when the recursive heirarchy of Wiggins’ theory is taken into account.
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For example in a creative search for music within a genre, the genre would be the concept and a
piece of music conforming to a genre would be a concept instance.
Artists often speak of self-imposed constraints as providing creatively fertile ground. In terms
of a creative search such constraints form the boundary of a space. It is possible for a search
to traverse beyond that boundary, thus finding invalid concepts. If invalid yet (according to
evaluation rules) valued concepts are found, then the space should be enlarged to include the
concept. An invalid concept which is not valued indicates that our traversal strategy is flawed and
should be modified to avoid such concepts in the future. A single traversal operation may result in
both valid and invalid concepts being found, indicating both the traversal rules and the definition
of the space should be modified. Returning to our musical example, we can think of a creative
piece of music that has altered the boundaries of a music genre, or defined a whole new genre.
Indeed music which does not break boundaries to any degree could be considered uncreative.
It is important to recognise that changes in conceptual structures first happen in an individual,
which in the case of music would be the composer or improviser. Another individual’s conceptual
structures may be modified to accord with a composer’s new concept by listening to the new
concept instance, although success is only likely if the individual already shares the music cultural
norms of the composer.
2 Embodied creative search
Wiggins (2006a,b) formalises creative search in order to provide a comparative framework, and
so is agnostic to views of representation. However by taking the view of embodied cognition
summarised here, we may define embodied creative search, where sensory-motor faculties are used
to navigate a geometric space, in direct metaphor to a search through a physical space. In this
view, creative computation requires concepts to be represented in a manner at least sympathetic
with the way humans perceive, act and introspect. More detail on this position in the context of
musical creativity is given by Forth et al. (2008). Further, an approach to symbolic description
of musical sounds informed by human perception termed vocable synthesis is provided by McLean
and Wiggins (2009). Both papers are available for download on the Dagstuhl seminar website
alongside this position statement.
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